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Exploring External Auditors’ Perceptions of the Motivations behind Management 
Fraud in Egypt – A Mixed Methods Approach 
 
1. Introduction 
Financial reporting fraud is a critical concern for investors and other stakeholders. It is the 
most costly type of corporate fraud as reported by a recent global study by the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) in 2016, and its impact goes beyond financial losses 
(Rezaee and Riley, 2010). Financial reporting fraud is more likely to be committed by 
management and thus it is sometimes referred to as management fraud (Wells, 2005; Brennan 
and Mcgrath, 2007; Goel and Gangolly, 2012; ACFE, 2014).  
Financial reporting fraud can be difficult to detect because it is often perpetrated by highly 
motivated and qualified teams of knowledgeable managers with the power to override 
internal controls (Buckhoff, 2001; Wang and Kleiner, 2005; Firth et al., 2011; Wells, 2011). 
However, it is believed that understanding the motivations behind management fraud is a key 
to its detection (Young, 2000; Albrecht et al., 2006; Ramamoorti, 2008). External auditors 
could help in the detection of financial reporting fraud, if they thought beyond the numbers in 
the financial statements and focused more on management motivations as they are key 
antecedents to committing fraud (Reinstein et al., 1998; Davies, 2000; Coenen, 2008; Hasnan 
et al., 2008; Ramamoorti et al., 2009). The aim of this study is therefore to explore external 
auditors’ perceptions of the motivations behind management fraud in Egypt. The study was 
motivated by the lack of consensus in the prior literature with regards to what motivates 
management to commit financial reporting fraud. The focus of the literature has also been on 
developed countries and little attention has been given to developing countries. This allowed 
the current study to expand knowledge in a developing context, such as Egypt, that has yet to 
receive substantial research attention. External auditors were chosen as participants in the 
current study for two reasons. First, the International Standard on Auditing (ISA 240): The 
Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements requires 
external auditors to assess the risk of financial reporting fraud by considering the three fraud 
triangle factors (i.e. motives to commit fraud, opportunity to commit fraud, and 
rationalisation of fraud). Hence, external auditors are in an appropriate position to understand 
management motivations given that they are required to assess the risk of motivations to 
commit fraud as part of their fraud risk assessment.   
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Second, it is very difficult to gain access to management who have been prosecuted for 
committing financial reporting fraud in Egypt. In addition, news about fraud cases are 
unlikely to be publicised in Egypt due to the secrecy of the culture (Dahawy et al, 2010). The 
findings revealed that the desire to obtain remuneration or bonuses, and the need to secure 
financing are the most common motivations behind management fraud in Egypt. The results 
imply that these two motives appear to be common across developed and developing nations. 
The study developed two guides of motivations behind management fraud. The first guide is 
based on findings from the literature and the second guide is based on insights from the audit 
field in Egypt. These guides could help external auditors recognise the signs that can trigger 
management motivations to engage in financial reporting fraud which, in turn, could increase 
the likelihood of detecting it. The results could also be useful for Egyptian regulators and 
external auditors who wish to reduce fraud risks in their own country.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section two, reviews the prior literature 
related to the motivations behind management fraud. Section three, describes the methods 
used for data collection and analysis. Section four, presents and discusses the research 
findings, and the paper then ends with the conclusion in section five. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature review indicates various motivations behind management fraud. For instance, 
management could be motivated to commit financial reporting fraud for financial reasons 
such as the need to secure financing (Dechow et al, 1996; Beasley et al., 2010; Firth et al., 
2011), to obtain remuneration or bonuses (Dunn, 1999; Andreson and Tirrell, 2004; Donoher 
et al., 2007), to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts (Albrecht et al., 2008), or to conceal 
company’s financial distress (Kapardis, 2002; Rosner, 2003). They could also be motivated 
to commit fraud by non-financial reasons such as ego (Dorminey et al., 2011), culture (Zahra 
et al, 2005), and ownership structure, especially in the case of state ownership and family 
ownership (Jara and Lopez, 2011; Connelly et al, 2012).  
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2.1. The Financial Motivations behind Management Fraud 
Although the literature revealed various financial motivations behind management fraud, the 
results of some prior studies were mixed in this area. For instance, evidence was found that 
bonuses and remuneration (Dunn, 1999; Anderson and Tirrell; 2004, Albrecht et al., 2008; 
Elayan and Meyer, 2008; Mckee and Santore, 2008; Beasley et al., 2010), equity ownership 
(Donoher et al., 2007), and stock options (Chesney and Gibson-Asner, 2005; Cullinan et al., 
2008; Troy et al., 2011) motivate management to commit financial reporting fraud. It was 
also observed that accounting manipulation appears to be driven by CEOs’ compensation 
incentives and facilitated by their power (Boyle et al., 2012), and that the likelihood of fraud 
is positively related to incentives from unrestricted stock and unrelated to restricted stock 
(Johnson et al., 2008). In contrast, other scholars (Dechow et al., 1996; Uddin, 2000; 
Erickson et al., 2006; Persons, 2012) found no evidence that managers are manipulating 
earnings to obtain bonuses or to sell their stockholdings at inflated prices. Gerety and Lehn 
(1997) added that the use of accounting based executive compensation schemes appear 
unimportant in affecting the decision to commit disclosure violations.  
The need to secure financing at low cost (Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley et al., 1999; Dunn, 
1999; Beasley et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2011) and the desire to avoid debt covenants 
restrictions (Dechow et al. 1996; Anderson and Tirrell, 2004) were found as motives for 
management to commit financial reporting fraud. However, the focus of the literature was on 
developed countries and only one study (Kamel and Elbanna, 2010) was conducted in Egypt 
as a developing context. This study, however, explored earnings management rather than 
financial reporting fraud and found that the main incentive for manipulating earnings in 
Egypt is to enhance the chances of obtaining a bank loan. Other studies (Rezaee, 2003; 
Albrecht et al., 2008; Beasley et al., 2010) observed that meeting or beating analysts’ 
forecasts could be a motive for management to commit financial reporting fraud. However, 
these studies lacked empirical evidence. Only one study by Perols and Lougee (2010) 
examined how previous earnings management impacts the likelihood that a firm will commit 
financial reporting fraud and found that fraud firms are more likely to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts and inflate revenue than non-fraud firms. 
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The need to conceal the company’s deteriorating financial condition is also one of the cited 
motives behind management fraud in the literature (Hasnan et al., 2008; Beasley et al., 2010; 
Firth et al., 2011). It was observed that companies committing fraud were experiencing net 
losses or were in close to break-even positions before the fraud (Beasley et al., 1999; 
Kapardis, 2002; Rosner, 2003; Johnson et al., 2008; Albrecht et al., 2008). However, only 
two of these studies (Hasnan et al., 2008 and Firth et al., 2011) were conducted in a 
developing context (i.e. Malaysia and China respectively). Several other studies found that 
management could be motivated by other financial factors to commit financial reporting 
fraud. Such factors include the desire to sustain previous year’s profit performance, report 
profits, and achieve high-share valuation (Kamel and El Banna, 2010), the need to cover up 
assets misappropriated for personal use (Beasley et al., 1999), to avoid de-listing from stock 
exchanges (Beasley et al., 1999; Firth et al., 2011), for sudden personal need for money 
(Drew, 2012), or greed (Albrecht et al., 2008).  
2.2. The Non-Financial Motivations behind Management Fraud 
Ownership structure such as in the case of family-owned businesses and state-owned 
businesses was mentioned in the literature as a motive for management to commit financial 
reporting fraud. However, the results were mixed leading to inconclusive evidence in this 
area. For instance, some researchers (Anderson and Tirrell, 2004; Hasnan et al., 2008; 
Albrecht et al., 2010; Prabowo and Simpson, 2011; Jara and Lopez, 2011; Connelly et al., 
2012) concluded that pressure from family owners in family-owned businesses to report high 
profits could motivate management to commit financial reporting fraud to please the owners 
and keep their jobs. Others (Chen et al., 2008; Salvato and Moores, 2010) observed improper 
disclosure cases in family-owned businesses. In contrast, Ahmad et al. (2008) found that a 
company’s form of control, whether it is controlled or not controlled by families or a sole 
proprietor, has no significant effect on misstatements of financial reports. Others (Prencipe et 
al., 2008; Tong; 2008; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011) concluded that family firms experience 
lower family agency costs compared to non-family firms. Klein et al. (2005) found no 
evidence that family ownership affects firm’s performance. Borisova et al. (2012) indicated 
that government ownership put pressure on management to commit fraud, while others 
(Hasnan et al., 2008; Kamel and Elbanna, 2012) found no evidence that this is the case.  
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The literature revealed other non-financial motives for management fraud. This includes 
coercion (Boyle et al., 2012; Dorminey et al., 2011) and high degree of competition in the 
market (Omar and Din, 2010). Other studies suggested ego (Anderson and Tirrell, 2004; 
Dorminey et al., 2011), culture and norms (Zahra et al., 2005), self-esteem (Rezaee and 
Riley, 2010), and ideology (Dorminey et al., 2011). However, their results were based on 
theory rather than empirical evidence.  
The current study compiled the motivations behind management fraud that were mentioned in 
the literature in table 1. The table includes the number of times each motive was cited to 
show the most commonly cited motivation(s), and to identify gaps in the literature. This list 
of management motivations was then used in the questionnaire designed by the current study 
to explore whether the motivations behind management fraud in Egypt are different from 
management in other contexts.  
(Insert table 1 here) 
Table 1 shows that in most of these studies, the focus was on developed countries leaving 
developing countries like Egypt unexplored. The most commonly cited motives behind 
management fraud were “Desire for remuneration (cited 22 times)” followed by “Ownership 
structure (cited 19 times)”. However, the results of the prior literature in this area were 
mixed. It can also be observed from the table that very few studies explored non-financial 
management motives and that most of these studies were based on theory rather than 
empirical evidence.  
3. Research Methods 
Mixed research methods, namely an online questionnaire and semi-structured interviews, 
were used for data collection (N.B. The questionnaire and interview schedule are available 
upon request). The current research used the sequential mixed methods research design where 
the first phase of data collection started by distributing an online questionnaire to participants 
followed by semi-structured interviews. The interviews were meant to complement and 
enrich the data collected via the questionnaire, which helped in depicting a complete picture 
of the current research issue. For instance, the interviews helped in exploring other 
motivations behind management fraud in Egypt that were not listed in the questionnaire. 
Open-ended questions in the interviews allowed participants to share their knowledge of 
management motivations freely without being restricted to a list of motives.  
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A three-stage strategy was used to gain access to participants. First, twenty potential 
participants were contacted via email or through their LinkedIn accounts and asked to fill in 
the online questionnaire. Then the snowballing technique was used to locate more contacts 
where existing contacts were asked to identify other possible contacts who might be 
interested to take part in the current study. Second, new contacts were developed through 
LinkedIn and Facebook, and were then asked to fill in the questionnaire. LinkedIn helped in 
gaining access to 127 participants, and Facebook helped in gaining access to three more 
participants. This led to a final sample of 150 participants. Third, the questionnaire included a 
question seeking participants’ consent to take part in an interview related to the current study. 
The questionnaire and interview schedule were pilot tested by six external auditors having 
more than 5 years of audit experience to make sure the wordings, structure, and questions 
were clear and understandable. Prior to pilot testing, two experienced accounting and audit 
academics were asked to comment on the representativeness and suitability of the research 
questions. This helped in establishing content validity and reliability of data and enabled 
necessary amendments prior to pilot testing. Positive feedback was received from the six 
external auditors with no change required. The interview schedule was also sent to 
participants prior to the interview to give them the opportunity to contact the researcher in 
case they had any questions or concerns about the interview questions. 
Eighty-two questionnaires were received making a response rate of approximately 55%. This 
compares favourably with other studies in the same setting which have indicated that the 
average response rate to questionnaire surveys in Egypt tends to range between 30% and 50% 
(Dixon and Woodhead, 2006; Elbanna and Child, 2007 as cited in Kamel and El Banna, 
2010). Thirty participants agreed to take part in the interview. Fourteen interviews were 
conducted via Skype and sixteen were conducted via telephone based on the preferences of 
participants. The interview lasted for about an hour. All interviewees agreed to have the 
interviews tape-recorded except for one. However, in all cases notes were taken during the 
interviews and were then sent to interviewees via email to ensure reliability and to build 
credibility. Probing questions were also used to explore responses during the interviews. 
Notes were summarised immediately after the interview to avoid errors, loss of key details, 
and to control bias. Notes were then saved based on interviewees’ codes rather than their 
names to maintain anonymity and confidentiality.  
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Management motives that were cited in prior literature were all compiled in a list of 18 
management motives (i.e. see table 1). The questionnaire participants were then asked to use 
a 5-likert scale to indicate their perception of the likelihood that each factor on the list could 
motivate management in Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud. “1” on the scale denotes 
“strongly disagree” that the motive is more likely to motivate management to commit 
financial reporting fraud in Egypt and “5” denotes “strongly agree”. The questionnaire 
participants were also asked about their audit experience, qualifications, and type of audit 
firm. An open-ended question was used to ask interviewees about their perceptions of the 
motivations behind management fraud to collect as much details as possible about this 
research issue. The interviewees were also asked about their job title, age, audit experience, 
type of audit office, professional qualifications, and the place of their professional audit 
training.  
Most participants work for Big 4 audit firms or other international audit firms in Egypt. 
External auditors working at the Big 4 and international audit firms are considered to be more 
knowledgeable, qualified, and experienced in the external audit profession (Deloitte, 2012; 
Wahdan et al, 2005; Samaha and Abdallah, 2012). Demographic data for the questionnaire 
and interview participants are summarised in tables 2 through 6. 
(Insert table 2 through 6 here) 
4. Research Findings and Discussion 
This study explored external auditors’ perceptions of the motivations behind management 
fraud. The results are summarised in table 7 and arranged based on the perceptions of 
participants from the most to the least likely motive.  
(Insert table 7 here) 
The findings indicate that the desire to obtain remuneration or bonuses was perceived as the 
most likely motive behind management fraud in Egypt (mean = 4.52). Most interviewees (i.e. 
15 out of 30) confirmed the results of the questionnaire in this area. Two interviewees said 
that obtaining bonuses could motivate management in Egypt to commit financial reporting 
fraud especially if obtaining the bonus is linked to the company’s financial performance or 
any other financial target. Three interviewees added that this is more common in large or 
listed companies and that the revenue account is more likely to be manipulated in this case.  
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This finding implies that the motive to receive remuneration or bonuses appears to be 
common across developed and developing nations (Dunn, 1999; Jaenicke 2001; Anderson 
and Tirrell, 2004; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Gibson-Asner, 2005; Donoher et al., 2007; 
Albrecht et al., 2008; Cullinan et al., 2008; Elayan and Meyer, 2008; Mckee and Santore, 
2008; Robison and Santore, 2008; Johnson et al., 2008; Chesney Chowdhury and Wang, 
2009; Cheffins, 2009; Beasley et al., 2010; Troy et al., 2011). The need to secure financing 
was perceived as the second most likely motive behind management fraud in Egypt (mean = 
4.10). This motive was also mentioned by twelve interviewees, which indicates that the need 
to secure financing appears to be common across developed and developing nations (Dechow 
et al., 1996; Beasley et al., 1999; Dunn, 1999; Anderson and Tirrell, 2004; Beasley et al., 
2010; Firth et al., 2011). The third most likely perceived management motive in Egypt was 
the desire to conceal financial distress or to avoid bankruptcy (mean = 4:00). This finding 
supports the results of prior studies (Beasley et al., 1999; Kapardis, 2002; Rosner, 2003; 
Albrecht et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2008; Hasnan et al., 2008; Beasley et al., 2010; Firth et 
al., 2011) that found evidence of this motive in other contexts. However, the current study 
was the first to find evidence that management in Egypt could be motivated by these factors 
(i.e. bonuses, need to secure financing, and need to conceal financial distress) to commit 
financial reporting fraud.  
 
Ten interviewees noted that “tax avoidance or tax evasion” could motivate management in 
Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud. One of them added that this is more common in 
small companies or family-owned businesses. Other interviewees added that management 
could commit financial reporting fraud in Egypt to keep their jobs (mentioned by 6 
interviewees), and for personal financial gain (mentioned by 5 interviewees). Five 
interviewees mentioned the need to meet or reduce budget variances could motivate 
management in Egypt to commit fraud especially when budget is unrealistic or targets are 
very difficult to achieve.  
 
With regards to non-financial motivations, pressure from owners in family-owned businesses 
was perceived as the most likely non-financial motive behind management fraud in Egypt 
(mean = 3.85). This was followed by the desire to avoid de-listing from a stock exchange 
(mean = 3.66). The high likelihood of these two non-financial motives reinforce the view that 
management could be motivated to commit fraud in family owned businesses due to pressure 
from family owners (Anderson and Tirell, 2004; Connelly et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2008; 
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Hasnan et al., 2008; Albrecht et al., 2010; Jara and Lopez, 2011), or to avoid delisting from 
stock exchange in listed companies (Firth et al., 2011). This is particularly notable in the 
Egyptian context as there is no evidence in the current study that ego and self-esteem, culture 
and norms, ideology, and the desire to take revenge are likely to motivate management in 
Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud. Five interviewees added that the need to survive in 
the market especially when there is monopoly or high competition in the market could be a 
motive for management in Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud. The need to meet 
bank’s covenant agreements was mentioned by four interviewees as a motive behind 
management fraud. Interviewees added that in this case, management could be forced to 
manipulate equity or financial ratios especially liquidity ratios to meet bank covenant 
agreements. Three interviewees said management in Egypt could be motivated by an existing 
opportunity in the company’s internal control system or a weakness in current accounting 
standards or regulations.  
 
The results from both the questionnaire and interviews were compared and then compiled in 
table 8. The table includes the number of participants (i.e. both questionnaire and interviews’ 
participants) that agreed with each of the listed motives. The rank given to each motive is 
based on the total number of participants who agreed with each motive. For example, the 
desire to get remuneration was suggested by 78 questionnaire participants and 15 
interviewees, so the total number of participants who agreed with that motive is 93 which was 
the highest total and thus was ranked number 1. All motives were then arranged per their 
likely occurrence from the most likely to the least likely based on the perception of external 
auditors in the current study.  
(Insert table 8 here) 
The outcome of the current study is a list of 45 motivations behind management fraud in 
Egypt (i.e. see table 9). The motives are ranked from the most likely to the least likely 
motives based on the perceptions of external auditors in Egypt. This list could help external 
auditors in Egypt recognise the signs that trigger the risk of motivations behind management 
fraud. This could enhance external auditors’ skills in fraud risk assessment which, in turn, 
could increase the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud.  
(Insert table 9 here) 
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5. Conclusion  
This study explored external auditors’ perceptions of the motivations behind management 
fraud. The findings indicate that the desire to obtain bonuses or remunerations, and the need 
to secure financing are more likely factors to motivate management in Egypt to commit 
financial reporting fraud. The results imply that these two motives appear to be common 
across developed and developing nations. However, in Egypt the risk of committing financial 
reporting fraud for bonuses or remuneration seems to be high in the case of large companies, 
listed companies, and when bonuses or remunerations are linked to financial targets. This 
study also found that tax avoidance is more likely to motivate management in Egypt to 
commit financial reporting fraud, and that this is more likely in small businesses or family-
owned businesses. Non-financial factors such as pressure from family owners in family-
owned businesses and the need to avoid delisting from stock exchange were also perceived as 
more likely motivations behind management fraud in Egypt. However, no evidence was 
found that ego, self-esteem, culture and norms, ideology, and the desire to take revenge are 
likely motives behind management fraud in Egypt.  
This study did not also use factor analysis to ascertain whether differences exist among some 
motives/factors, and thus this should be the focus of future studies. Despite this limitation, the 
current study is the first to explore the motivations behind management fraud in Egypt, a 
context that has yet to receive substantial research attention. The findings of the current study 
could be beneficial for audit regulators and government in Egypt who wish to reduce fraud 
risks in their own country. The guides of management motivations developed by this study 
could be useful for external auditors in their fraud risk assessments, and for audit professional 
bodies in their anti-fraud training programmes.  
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